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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on the appeal of 
plaintiff Robert W. Mauthe M.D. P.C. challenging the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment against its complaint 
brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”).  We consolidated this case for 
argument with Mauthe v. Nat’l Imaging Assocs., Inc., No. 18-
2119, 2019 WL 1752591 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 2019) (“NIA”), a 
case that the same plaintiff filed against a different defendant 
under the TCPA because the two cases raised similar issues.  
Although the plaintiff in both cases is a professional 
corporation, we will refer to the plaintiff as Robert W. Mauthe, 
as though an individual, as we did in NIA.  In this case, Mauthe 
alleged that he received an unsolicited advertisement via fax 
from defendants Optum, Inc. and OptumInsight, Inc., related 
entities, in violation of the TCPA and included in his complaint 
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a supplemental state law claim for common law conversion.  
Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the Court 
granted their motion on the TCPA claim and dismissed the state 
law claim without prejudice, as it declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over it.  Robert Mauthe, M.D. PC v. Optum, Civ. 
No. 17-1643, 2018 WL 360912 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2018) 
(“Optum”).  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the 
order of the Court in both respects. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are essentially undisputed.  
Defendants maintain a national database of healthcare providers, 
containing providers’ contact information, demographics, 
specialties, education, and related data.  Defendants market, sell, 
and license the database typically to health care, insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies, who use it to update their provider 
directories, identify potential providers to fill gaps in their 
network of providers, and validate information when processing 
insurance claims.  Obviously, it is important that the information 
contained in the database be accurate and Mauthe, who is a 
healthcare provider, does not contend otherwise.   
One of the ways defendants update and verify the 
information in their database is to send unsolicited faxes to 
healthcare providers listed in the database, requesting them to 
respond and correct any outdated or inaccurate information.  The 
faxes inform the recipients that: 
As part of ongoing data maintenance of our 
Optum Provider Database product, Optum 
regularly contacts healthcare practitioners to 
verify demographic data regarding your office 
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location(s).  This outreach is independent of and 
not related to your participation in any Optum 
network.  By taking a few minutes to verify your 
practice information is current, your information 
will be promptly updated in Optum Provider 
Database. 
This data is used by health care related 
organizations to aid in claims payment, assist with 
provider authentication and recruiting, augment 
their own provider data, mitigate healthcare fraud 
and publish accurate provider directories. 
Optum, 2018 WL 3609012, at *2.  The faxes also advise the 
recipients that “[t]here is no cost to you to participate in this data 
maintenance initiative.  This is not an attempt to sell you 
anything.”  Id.  The fax that defendants sent Mauthe included 
these provisions. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We exercise de novo review on this appeal.  See Bradley 
v. West Chester Univ. of Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 
F.3d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 2018).  “Our review of the District 
Court’s [summary judgment] decision is plenary, and we apply 
the same standard as the District Court to determine whether 
summary judgment was appropriate.”  State Auto Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  
“[S]ummary judgment is properly granted ‘if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Sconiers v. 
United States, 896 F.3d 595, 597 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).1 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Under the TCPA, it is unlawful to send an unsolicited 
advertisement by fax.  NIA, 2019 WL 1752591, at *2.  Mauthe 
asks us to hold that the fax was an unsolicited advertisement 
which the TCPA prohibited defendants from sending to him.  In 
NIA, we articulated the standard to determine when a fax has 
been sent to a potential direct purchaser of a product or service 
in violation of the TCPA, but we also opined that liability for a 
TCPA violation is not necessarily limited to a situation in which 
a fax is sent to potential direct purchasers of the sender’s 
product or services.  Id. at *3 n.3.  Mauthe does not claim to be a 
potential direct purchaser of defendants’ services and defendants 
disclaim any intention to sell him anything.  Indeed, their fax to 
him recited as much, as it said that the fax was not an attempt to 
sell him anything.  After our examination of the fax we have 
concluded that there is no basis on which defendants can be held 
to have violated the TCPA on the basis of the fax if the meaning 
of the advertisement is viewed in a conventional way.  
Consequently, we consider a possible broader basis for liability 
predicated on the fact that this case involves third parties beyond 
defendants and Mauthe, i.e., the users of defendants’ database. 
An example of a possible TCPA violation by the sending 
of a fax to an entity other than a possible direct purchaser of the 
sender’s product or services is a fax sent to a doctor encouraging 
the doctor to prescribe a particular drug to the doctor’s patients 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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who, rather than the doctor, are the likely purchasers of the 
sender’s product.  Id.  We refer to liability in such situations as 
“third-party based liability,”2 as the sender is not attempting to 
sell the recipient anything.  Id.  But in NIA because potential 
third-party based liability was not at issue, we did not address 
the question of whether there could be a third-party based 
liability by reason of the sending of a fax.  That issue now is 
squarely before us because defendants sent the fax to Mauthe in 
order to update their database to be accessed by third parties 
who were not the recipients of defendants’ faxes and the faxes 
were not an attempt to sell Mauthe or the putative class 
members anything. 
Mauthe advances his third-party based liability argument 
on a theory that, although he was not a purchaser of defendants’ 
products or services, defendants violated the TCPA because they 
had a profit motive in sending him the fax so that the fax should 
be regarded as an advertisement.  Mauthe asserts that defendants 
sought the information in the fax to enhance the accuracy of 
their database and thus increase their profits.  We agree with the 
stated factual basis for his claim because defendants were using 
the faxes to improve the accuracy of their database.  However, 
the TCPA only prohibits unsolicited advertisements, not any and 
all faxes even if sent for a commercial purpose.  It seems beyond 
doubt that a fax does not become an advertisement merely 
because the sender intended it to enhance the quality of its 
products or services and thus its profits.  After all, a commercial 
entity takes almost all of its actions with a profit motivation.  
                                                 
2 We used the term “third-party based liability” even though the 
parties do not do so in their briefs.  They do, however, refer to 
third parties in their briefs. 
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But as we opined in NIA, “[a]dvertising is the action of drawing 
the public’s attention to something to promote its sale.  So to be 
an ad, the fax must promote goods or services to be bought or 
sold, and it should have profit as an aim.”  NIA, 2019 WL 
1752591, at *2 (internal quotations, quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 We are satisfied that to establish third-party based 
liability under the TCPA a plaintiff must show that the fax: (1) 
sought to promote or enhance the quality or quantity of a 
product or services being sold commercially; (2) was reasonably 
calculated to increase the profits of the sender; and (3) directly 
or indirectly encouraged the recipient to influence the 
purchasing decisions of a third party.  As we explained in NIA, 
“the fax must convey the impression . . . that a seller is trying to 
make a sale[.]”  NIA, 2019 WL 1752591, at *2.  It is not enough 
that the sender sent a fax with a profit motive—in order to show 
that the sender is trying to make a sale, there must be a nexus 
between the fax and the purchasing decisions of an ultimate 
purchaser whether the recipient of the fax or a third party.  The 
liability standard articulated in NIA, and the one we articulate 
here in a third-party based liability situation, hinges on whether 
the fax was somehow intended to influence a potential buyer’s 
decision in making a purchase, irrespective of whether the 
sender sent the fax to the potential buyer or to a third party and 
must have been intended to or at least be capable of influencing 
a buyer’s purchasing decision.  If we adopted a less demanding 
standard, we would risk extending too far the prohibitions that 
the TCPA established.  We believe that our construction of the 
TCPA faithfully adheres to what the TCPA facially prohibits, 
while broadly construing the TCPA to provide plaintiffs with an 
alternative theory of liability even when the fax is not sent to 
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potential direct purchasers of a defendant’s products or services. 
 We give an example that supports our conclusion and 
demonstrates why we must be concerned with possible 
overreaching of the application of the TCPA that we derive from 
the analogous field of telemarketing, a practice that the TCPA 
regulates.  In dealing with telemarketing the TCPA prohibits 
any telephone call to any residential telephone 
line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to 
deliver a message without the prior express 
consent of the called party, unless the call is 
initiated for emergency purposes [or is] exempted 
by rule or order by the Commission under 
paragraph (2)(B). 
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).  Under the rules promulgated by the 
Federal Communications Commission, calls are exempt from 
the statutory prohibition “if not made for a commercial purpose” 
or, as germane here, if they do “not include or introduce an 
advertisement or constitute telemarketing.”  47 C.F.R. § 
64.1200(a)(3).  The FCC has also opined that “calls conducting 
research, market surveys, political polling or similar activities 
[that] do not involve solicitation as defined by our rules” are 
exempt from the statutory prohibition on artificially prescribed 
calls.  In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
TCPA, 1992 WL 690928, at *15, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, 8774 ¶ 41 
(Oct. 16, 2012).  Consequently, a marketing firm making calls to 
conduct pure market research, and a pollster conducting a 
political poll by telephone, do not violate TCPA’s telemarketing 
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prohibition.3 
 Commercial entities conducting research sometimes do 
so by sending faxes.  Under Mauthe’s theory, these firms would 
violate TCPA’s prohibition on the sending of an unsolicited fax 
advertisement because they would send their faxes for the 
purposes of improving their operations and thus their profits.  
But such faxes would not promote the sale of any products or 
services, or seek to influence the purchasing decisions of a 
potential buyer.  We will not adopt a construction that broadly 
would limit commercial activities to the extent Mauthe invites.  
See NIA, 2019 WL 1752591, at *2-3.  The requirement for 
establishing TCPA liability that we set forth is that there be a 
nexus between the sending of the fax and the sender’s product 
or services and the buyer’s decision to purchase the product or 
services accomplishes the TCPA objective without infringing on 
other commercial activities.4 
                                                 
3 We note that there is a petition for expedited declaratory ruling 
on whether market research surveys are fax advertisements as 
defined by the TCPA pending before the FCC.  See Lyngaas v. 
J. Reckner Assocs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-12867, 2019 WL 166227, 
at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2019). 
4 In fact, under Mauthe’s theory an employer with a letterhead 
listing its address, telephone number and products and services 
would violate the TCPA if it sent a fax on its letterhead to 
inquire about the qualifications of a job applicant from the 
applicant’s former employer because employee selection is 
certainly related to making a profit. 
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 Turning to the facts of this case, Mauthe’s claim does not 
survive our standard for third-party based liability or any other 
theory of liability under the TCPA.  Though defendants intended 
their faxes to obtain information enhancing the quality of their 
services, and thus reasonably calculated their faxes to increase 
their profits by keeping their database updated, the faxes did not 
attempt to influence the purchasing decisions of any potential 
buyer, whether a recipient of a fax or a third party.  Moreover, 
the fax sent to Mauthe did not encourage him to influence the 
purchasing decisions or those of a third party.  Though we 
appreciate the annoyance and/or harassment Mauthe felt 
receiving unsolicited faxes, we are constrained in reaching our 
decision by what the TCPA actually prohibits—it does not 
prohibit all unsolicited faxes, just advertisements.  We will not 
distort the meaning of “advertisement” to accommodate 
Mauthe’s case.  Therefore, we will uphold the District Court’s 
conclusion that defendants’ fax was not an “advertisement” 
under the TCPA. 
 The District Court also held that the fax was not a pretext 
to more commercial solicitation.  Optum, 2018 WL 3609012, at 
*7.  As we stated in NIA, we have not endorsed and do not now 
do so the pretext theory of liability under the TCPA, a matter 
that is still open.  2019 WL 1752591, at *3.  However, for the 
same reasons that we set forth in NIA in rejecting a pretext 
claim even if such a claim is potentially viable, Mauthe’s pretext 
claim fails because there was no evidence that defendants 
“intended to send Mauthe any future faxes, let alone any more 
advertisements.”  Id. at *3 n.4.  We recognize that defendants 
may send Mauthe another fax to verify his information, but that 
fax will no more be an advertisement than the fax here if it is of 
similar content.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the fax that 
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defendants already sent was a pretext so that it later could send 
an additional fax.  Thus, we also will uphold the District Court’s 
ruling that defendants’ fax was not a pretext to further 
commercial solicitation. 
 Inasmuch as we hold that the District Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on Mauthe’s 
TCPA claim, the only federal claim in the case, we also hold 
that the Court did not err in declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Mauthe’s state law claim.  In this regard a court 
does not err if it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over state claims after it dismisses a federal claim on which its 
jurisdiction is based in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances.  Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 380 F.3d 729, 751 
(3d Cir. 2004).  There are no extraordinary circumstances here.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of 
July 27, 2018. 
 
